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Abstract
Interpreters in all settings, in all parts of the world, and throughout history have la-
mented the poor quality of the language they must deal with in source texts. This chapter 
will review some recent publications on interpreting quality criteria, user expectations, 
and the associated challenges facing interpreters in different settings (Kondo 2006; Peng 
2006; Lee 2009; Ng 2009; Napier et al. 2009; Kent 2009). The constraints facing court in-
terpreters in adversarial settings will be analyzed, particularly when interpreting from 
English to Spanish for immigrants who may have little or no formal education. A variety 
of solutions available to court interpreters will be explored within the context of prevail-
ing professional standards in the United States.
Garbage In, Garbage Out:





Throughout history, interpreters have struggled with the same problem: flawed 
source messages. Just as translators are more sensitive than the average reader to 
errors or ambiguities in source texts, interpreters are hyper-attuned to the qual-
ity of the speech that serves as the source for their interpretation. Interpreting 
students often ask, “Should I improve on the speaker’s message?”. The answer to 
that question, like so many others, is “It depends”. This chapter will attempt to 
provide some answers for interpreters in legal settings on the basis of a thorough 
analysis of the problem, an examination of quality in interpreting and how it 
is defined in different contexts, and a discussion of various studies on user and 
interpreter expectations for their performance. Those elements will be used to 
further refine the statement of the problem, and the chapter will conclude with 
some suggestions of strategies that interpreters can employ when faced with im-
perfect source messages. 
2. Statement of the problem
Judiciary interpreters are taught that they must interpret all utterances with no 
distortion due to “addition, omission, explanation or paraphrasing” (NAJIT, n.d.). 
To achieve this objective, they must have a full command of all registers of their 
working languages, including the erudite language of legal arguments, the le-
gal jargon often used in colloquies between attorneys, the technical register of 
expert witnesses, the speaking style unique to law enforcement personnel, the 
street slang of gang members, and the “baby talk” used by children. For example, 
if a judge says, “Do you waive time for sentencing?”, the interpreter should pro-
vide a target-language version as close to that wording as possible, rather than 
clarifying it by saying, “Do you waive the legally required delay before the judge 
passes sentence?”. Similarly, a child witness’s statement that “he showed me his 
pipi”, should not be made more anatomically explicit by the interpreter, or the 
jury would have a distorted impression of the child’s level of sophistication. 
In order to pass their certification exams, court interpreters devote many 
hours to studying glossaries and reading background material on firearms, drugs, 
criminalistics, sex offenses, criminal procedure, traffic terms, regionalisms, and 
street slang, among many other subjects. What they cannot prepare for, however, 
is the nonsensical statements made not only by unsophisticated witnesses with 
little formal education, but also – perhaps surprisingly – by trained professionals 
such as expert witnesses and, yes, even lawyers and judges. In a study of expert 
witness testimony, Miguelez (2001: 4) found that: 
[T]he language used by expert witnesses and by attorneys when addressing them, is 
often grammatically faulty, convoluted, imprecise, repetitive and lacking in coher-
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ence. Therefore, preparing vocabulary, while useful, will not guarantee success, given 
that the challenges in comprehending and interpreting expert testimony are not al-
ways strictly – or even principally – lexical in nature. 
Consider this excerpt from a trial transcript examined by Miguelez in her re-
search:
Q: Now referring to the other areas that you mentioned, density, what is density?
A: This is the weight of the mass of an object, the weight in air as against water: It was 
the old Greek principle when Archimedes got into the bathtub and there was so much 
water came out that was specific gravity so much water displaced. The density of an 
object is measured in this relation between the relation of its weight and mass in air 
as against its weight and mass in liquid. In the laboratory the way we run density we 
actually take a glass particle and we bounce it in a liquid mixture and in this case the 
mixture is ‘Bromifoam alcohol.’ Bromifoam being a heavy liquid on which you can 
float the rocks and alcohol being very light and you put in a glass particle and it neither 
rises nor falls in that liquid. You can either do that by two ways, by heating the liquid 
and making it lighter and the object will fall. If you cool it and make the liquid denser 
the particle will rise. Here is a point where we actually balance it in liquid, neither 
rises nor falls, a little particle so small you have to use a magnifying glass. At that time 
when we finally let it down, the equilibrium, we have a definite balance and we take 
the count of liquid which gives us our density reading. So, we read the density of the 
liquid, which is very sensitive, much more sensitive method, much more sensitive 
than the old method they have of giving the specific gravity. (ibid.: 6) 
Miguelez comments that “there was virtually no specialized jargon here and 
yet the answer was quite incomprehensible” (to put it mildly). Another excerpt 
quoted in her paper does have some specialized jargon, but the problem of unin-
telligibility is not limited to terminology:
So far as the double action of the function of State’s Exhibit 1, […] I found this did not 
function properly in the double action of the State’s Exhibit 1. After a cartridge was 
fired, it was necessary to slightly pull the hammer back to a first position causing a 
small click as it makes contact with the mechanism before the action of the function 
of the weapon would be free enough to function as double action where you actually 
depress the trigger […]. (ibid.: 10)
Similarly, Stojkovic-Ring (2009), referring to the interpreting at the Internation-
al Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), notes that there are “situa-
tions in which the interpreters are forced to stick to the word-for-word strategy 
(to comply with the users’ perception of accuracy, particularly in low-context vs. 
high-context messages) at the expense of the sense, and … situations where the 
interpreters judge it is ‘safe’ to do the opposite” (ibid.: 21). As an example, she pre-
sents an excerpt from testimony in which an English-speaking attorney exam-
ines an English-speaking witness (interpreted simultaneously into French for 
the judges and other attorneys):
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A [attorney]: Who was involved in that incident by appearance or group?
T [witness]: Sorry, can you repeat the question please? I didn’t understand or I don’t 
know if I did or didn’t.
D [defense]: Il s’agit d’un problème d’interprétation sûrement. [There surely must be a 
problem with the interpretation.]
It is clear that even without interpretation, participants in legal proceedings may 
have difficulty understanding the language used. Many court interpreters will 
relate to the examples cited here, and will undoubtedly have plenty of anecdotes 
to tell about similar witnesses. 
It is worth asking how much jurors understand of testimony like these two 
excerpts. Napier, et al. (2009), drawing on previous studies of jurors’ ability to 
understand the instructions judges give them on the law they are supposed to 
apply to cases in which they must reach verdicts, conducted their own study of 
mock jurors. In their study, they presented both hearing and deaf participants 
with a judge’s summation of a real-life criminal case, taken from a transcript of 
the proceedings, and then asked them questions for the purpose of determining 
whether jurors could understand proceedings conveyed through an interpreter 
just as well as jurors hearing the source message. They found that although there 
was little difference between the two groups’ grasp of the facts, some of the legal 
concepts were “problematic” for both deaf and hearing participants due to the 
“challenging” language used by the judge (Napier et al. 2009: 107). 
As stated in the introduction, however, judiciary interpreters are not alone in 
having to contend with incomprehensible source messages. For example, Kent 
(2009) found in her interviews with conference interpreters in the European 
Parliament that there is a great deal of frustration with speakers who insist on 
addressing delegates in languages they do not fully master, usually French or 
English, those being the languages shared by the largest number of delegates. 
Interpreters, who confess that sometimes “you’re not really sure they know what 
they’re saying,” have coined terms such as “Globe-ish”, “this whatever-the-hell-it-
is”, “this ridiculous Pidgin English” and “what they think of as English”, to describe 
this phenomenon (ibid.: 63). One interpreter lamented, “If it’s a Polish speaking 
bad English, I have no clue [what they mean]” (ibid.: 66). Kondo (2006) reports on 
a survey of Japanese conference interpreters (all native speakers of Japanese) in 
which many of them complained that Japanese speakers were “too vague, too ob-
scure, too ambiguous” for them to fully understand the source speech and render 
it in their B language, English. One respondent said, “I have difficulties when the 
Japanese speaker speaks horribly, making it impossible to see what he is trying 
to say” (ibid.: 177). Kondo also recounts an incident in which the Japanese Minis-
ter of Agriculture and Fisheries expressed his view on a fishing dispute with the 
United States, and after the interpreter finished interpreting his statements into 
English, the U.S. negotiator said, “What the hell is he trying to say?”. The inter-
preter calmly rendered the outburst into Japanese, later explaining his reasoning 
that it was the minister’s responsibility to clarify what he meant (ibid.: 176). In 
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the legal setting, particularly in adversarial proceedings, interpreters take a simi-
lar stance: if one of the parties does not understand a statement, it is that party’s 
responsibility to ask for a clarification (Gonzalez et al. 1991: 476).
3. Communication and meaning
Kent’s (2009: 55) study at the European Parliament emerged from an effort to ex-
amine the “shared responsibility between interpreters and interlocutors” for the 
effectiveness of interpreted communication. To do this she looks at two models 
of communication, the ritual and transmission views, to “illuminate the struggle 
in Interpreting Studies to clearly distinguish linguistic meaning from socially-
emergent meaningfulness”. 
The transmission view of communication “depicts meaning as an object (a 
message) to be physically moved”, leading to interpreters being conceptualized 
as “conduits” of information. This is the way interpreted interactions have tradi-
tionally been viewed. Kent emphasizes the limitations of this approach:
However, the transmission metaphor only holds up if one neglects the numerous in-
stances in which transparent transfers of meaning fail. In other words, if one ignores 
the evidence of misunderstanding (with or without simultaneous interpretation), 
one operates within a reduced framework that considers only the immediate utilitar-
ian effects of language. (ibid.: 59)
The ritual view, in contrast, considers communication to be “the representation 
of shared beliefs” (Kent, 2009: 60), and comprehension of messages depends on 
whether the interlocutors have a shared identity – a point also made by Henrik-
sen (2007: 16) in her discussion of “eurospeak” or “the eurolect”. In interpreted 
interactions, the interpreter must share two identities and find a middle ground 
between them in which to construct meaning. The jargon of the European Parlia-
ment is an example of a language used by individuals whose identities overlap, to 
the extent that they are all European delegates representing their countries in a 
deliberative body. However, to the extent that they come from different countries 
and speak different languages, their identities do not overlap, hence, the need for 
interpreters. When the delegates elect to use a lingua franca instead of speaking 
their native languages, the result is the incomprehensible “Globe-ish” described 
by the interpreters. The source of the frustration expressed by the interpreters 
interviewed by Kent is the expectation (by the delegates and by themselves) that 
they will bridge the gap between Pidgin English and standard Greek, for exam-
ple, just as effectively as they bridge the gap between standard English and stand-
ard Greek.
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4. User expectations of quality
A number of researchers have examined the expectations of interpreters’ clients 
to determine whether their notions of quality and what constitutes a successful 
interpretation coincide with the interpreters’ own views on these issues. Qual-
ity, as defined by interpreters, is summed up by Déjean le Féal (cited in Kurz, 
1993/2002: 312) as follows: 
What our listeners receive through their earphones should produce the same effect on 
them as the original speech does on the speaker’s audience. It should have the same 
cognitive content and be presented with equal clarity and precision in the same type 
of language. Its language and oratory quality should be at least on the same level as 
that of the original speech, if not better, given that we are professional communica-
tors […]
In particular, Kurz (1993/2002), Moser (1996) and Collados Aís (2002) surveyed 
users of conference interpretation services to elicit their ideas about quality in-
terpreting. Although these researchers did not reach uniform conclusions, they 
all found “a clear separation between quality and the perceived quality or success 
of a simultaneous interpretation” (Collados Aís, 2002: 336). Kurz (2002: 321) con-
cluded from her study that all respondents valued “sense consistency” and “logi-
cal cohesion” more than a native accent or a pleasant voice, although diplomats 
were more concerned than technical experts (physicians and engineers) about 
the “completeness” of the interpretation. She attributes this disparity to diplo-
mats’ interest in “full understanding of the arguments [of other delegates] with 
all their nuances”, whereas the technical experts “would opt for an intelligent, 
logical, terminologically correct summary of the original”. 
Moser’s survey (1996: 163) confirmed that delegates showed a “clear prefer-
ence for concentration on essentials” rather than a complete rendition of the 
source speech. He analyzed the data according to the size of the conference, how 
technical the subject matter was, and the participants’ years of experience attend-
ing interpreted conferences. Across the board, he found “a marked preference 
for faithfulness to meaning” rather than “a literal reproduction of what was be-
ing said” (ibid.: 167), though delegates at large technical conferences attributed 
more importance to the correct use of terminology than the completeness of the 
interpretation.
Collados Aís (2002) sought to test a number of hypotheses about end-users’ 
and interpreters’ evaluations of the content and the form of interpreted speeches 
by presenting different versions of a single speech in a controlled study, manip-
ulating the intonation of delivery and the sense consistency of the interpreta-
tion. Although the end-users, not knowing the source language, could not assess 
whether there were content errors in the interpretation, they could determine 
whether the speech as a whole was coherent and consistent with their under-
standing of the subject matter (in this case, jurisprudence). The majority of them 
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were less concerned about content than about the interpreter’s tone of voice; in-
deed, many of them failed to notice even glaring factual errors that were intro-
duced into the speech (ibid.: 335). 
In the judicial context, a quality interpretation is considered to be one that 
produces a “legal equivalent”, defined by Gonzalez et al. (1991: 16) as “a linguisti-
cally true and legally appropriate interpretation of statements spoken or read in 
court, from the second language into English or vice versa”. In other words:
[T]he court interpreter is required to interpret the original source material without 
editing, summarizing, deleting, or adding while conserving the language level, style, 
tone, and intent of the speaker. (ibid.: 16)
Does the theoretical view of quality correspond to the way different actors judge 
quality in real-life court proceedings? In the case of incomplete thoughts or miss-
ing words in expert witness testimony, Miguelez (2001: 12) noted, “As with all 
speech, the receiver needs and expects some type of closure and completion”. 
In this regard, consumers of judicial interpretation are no different from other 
users. Lee’s (2009) survey of court interpreters and legal professionals on their 
expectations of the interpreter during witness examinations is also of interest. 
She found the same conflicting views as those reported in the conference inter-
preting studies mentioned above. When asked whether the interpreter should 
match the style of the source messages, “nearly three quarters of the legal pro-
fessionals (166) responded in the affirmative and two thirds of the interpreters 
(24) responded that this was what they sought to do” (ibid.: 47). When Lee delved 
further and specified either witnesses’ answers or counsel’s questions, however, 
she discovered a significant discrepancy:
As for reproducing witnesses’ speech style, 29 interpreters (78%) reported that they 
did in fact strive to do so, whereas only 134 legal professionals (59%) responded that 
this was what the court interpreter should do. The answer also depended on whose 
style was at stake: 32 more legal professionals expected the court interpreter to repro-
duce the questioning style of counsel compared to the speech style of witnesses. The 
contrast between legal professionals and interpreters in this regard is particularly 
striking: contrary to the legal professionals’ views, more interpreters responded that 
they reproduced the style of witnesses’ speech than that of counsel. (ibid.: 47, emphasis 
in the original)
Some interpreters admitted that “they sometimes simplified questions, or ex-
plained legal terms rather than simply using the equivalent terms in the target 
language, or that they conveyed only the main point of the question if they per-
ceived that the witness was having difficulty understanding”, despite admoni-
tions against doing so in the literature on court interpreting (ibid.: 47). In other 
words, they geared their interpretation to their perception of the listeners’ abili-
ty to understand. The notion of a “listener-centered” interpretation (Stern, 2004) 
will be explored further in a later part of this chapter.
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5. Coherence and quality
The studies cited in the previous section show that consumers of interpreting 
services are not always good judges of the quality of the interpretation, at least 
in terms of the standards set by the interpreting profession itself. In the context 
of training future interpreters, Peng (2006: ii) writes, “Talking about quality of 
interpreting, ‘making sense’ is generally held to be one of the most important 
criteria for judging the success of a given interpretation”. She also affirms that 
coherence is the “gold standard” of interpreting, “the most highly valued quality” 
(ibid.: 9). Accordingly, she has developed a “coherence profile” for both source and 
target texts.
Peng starts from the premise that trainees must be aware of quality stand-
ards to attain their goals, and that they “inherit the way trainers describe quality” 
(2006: ii). However, unlike the working interpreters and end-users surveyed in 
the studies cited previously, Peng notes that trainers do not “share a common 
meta-language to discuss quality attributes of interpretations” (ibid.). Therefore, 
she researched standards accepted by professional interpreters and academics 
and devised a feedback tool to enable student interpreters to assess their own 
output, particularly with respect to coherence. She analyzed a number of con-
secutive interpretations by students and professionals and concluded that the 
two groups took different approaches to dealing with coherence: “Trainees tend 
to focus on local cohesion while professionals tend to emphasise the global struc-
ture of the discourse” (ibid.: iii).
The feedback tool devised by Peng (2006: 82-83) is quite detailed, including 
many different elements for evaluating the coherence of interpretations. The 
elements of coherence most relevant to this discussion can be summed up as 
follows: 1) accuracy and completeness (correctness of factual information, con-
serving the speaker’s intent and emotion); 2) quality of the interpreter’s language 
(grammar and usage, making sense, correct use of terminology, complete sen-
tences); and 3) delivery (clarity of articulation, proper intonation, pauses in ap-
propriate places, pacing). It is important to point out however, that the source 
speeches given to the interpreters were themselves quite coherent. The follow-
ing excerpt of one of the English speeches is representative of their quality:
Thank you very much all of you. I look forward to all those contributions and perhaps 
from my personal point of view particularly to hearing the Greeks’ perspective on im-
migration which I have some familiarity. But before we begin, I would like to a few 
words about the causes of immigration. I like to turn first of all to the question of 
asylum seekers, and examine statistics over the past ten years for asylum seekers en-
tering the EU. Over the past ten years more than a half of the asylum seekers entering 
the EU came from former Yugoslavia, Iraq, Romania, Sri Lanka, Iran, the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, Afghanistan, Turkey, Bosnia and Somalia. And I like first to think 
for a moment what these countries have in common. Why is it that so many asylum 
seekers are coming from these regions? I think what these countries have in common 
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is perhaps not so much poverty or an increasing population or a low life expectancy, 
but some kind of conflict. (Peng, 2006: 172)
Although this speech contains some errors in English style, it is quite easy to fol-
low, particularly considering that it was delivered orally (and therefore, the lack 
of commas would presumably be overcome by pausing in the appropriate plac-
es). The criteria against which the interpretations were being judged, therefore, 
were in keeping with the quality of the source speeches. Returning to the topic 
of this chapter, users of interpretation services have the same expectations for 
coherence, regardless of how coherent the source speech was. If we compare the 
sample speech from Peng’s research to that excerpted from the Miguelez (2001) 
study, we see an obvious contrast. One other caveat is in order: Peng’s work fo-
cused on consecutive interpretation, whereas simultaneous interpreting would 
be required in the case of speeches in the European Parliament and expert wit-
ness testimony in court. It is commonly accepted that consecutive interpreting 
allows for greater coherence of the target language text because the interpreter 
benefits from having heard the entire speech (Russell, 2000: 43). Nevertheless, 
the criteria identified by Peng are useful tools for evaluating some aspects of 
quality.
6. Legal language
With respect to the judicial context that is the focus of this chapter, the incom-
prehensibility of legal language in general has been the subject of much criti-
cism. Melinkoff ’s (1963) seminal work on English legal usage is still relevant, 
despite the many years that have passed since he wrote it, which reveals the re-
luctance of the legal profession to change its ways. Translators of legal texts, al-
ready challenged by the barriers that separate different countries’ legal systems, 
also struggle with the nearly impenetrable style of writing adopted by lawyers as 
they draft contracts, treaties, and other documents. For example, Loiacono (2010: 
257), examining the translation of bilateral agreements between Italy and Aus-
tralia, comments, “The Agreements are not always written to make their content 
easily understandable for ordinary readers”. To illustrate his point, he presents 
this excerpt:
There shall be a Mixed Commission equally composed of representatives of the Con-
tracting Parties jointly chaired by officials from the Italian and Australian Film Indus-
tries and assisted by experts appointed by the respective competent authorities to 
supervise and review the working of this Agreement to resolve any difficulty which 
may arise and to make any proposals considered necessary for any modification of this 
Agreement. (ibid.: 257)
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This sentence is not impossible to understand, just convoluted; an educated 
layperson reading the text can eventually figure out what it means (though if it 
were delivered orally, it would be difficult to follow). Loiacono contrasts the “le-
gal equivalence approach” to legal translation, which emphasizes preservation of 
the letter of the source text with a view to guaranteeing concordance between the 
two versions, with the “functional approach” whereby the translation “expresses 
the intended meaning and leads to the intended results” (ibid.: 246). The English-
Italian translations of the bilateral agreements he evaluated adopt the former 
approach and do “not make any great effort to be easily comprehensible for ei-
ther the Italian-speaking or English-speaking public” (ibid.: 260). The dichotomy 
between these two approaches to translation is analogous to the choice between 
a literal interpretation and a target-language version preserving the “sense con-
sistency” of the original message, which was presented to the users of conference 
interpreting services surveyed by Kurz (1993/2002), Collados Aís (2002), and Mo-
ser (1996).
Even though interpreted court proceedings are oral rather than written, 
much of the language in the courtroom is based on written texts (jury instruc-
tions, criminal and civil codes, contracts, and the like). To fully understand such 
discourse, court interpreters must read similar texts and become familiar with 
the legal register in their preparations for interpreting. They must adopt strate-
gies similar to those described by Loiacono (2010) when rendering the discourse 
of judges and attorneys into the target language. Framing communication in the 
courtroom in the terms adopted by Kent (2006), the language of legal profes-
sionals in the courtroom is a product of their shared identity, and for those out-
side the “inner circle”, the language may seem like gibberish. The subject of this 
chapter is not only the complex, dense, abstruse language of legal writings and 
the spoken form of that language, but also the genuinely garbled and nonsensi-
cal language of spontaneous oral speech that often occurs in court proceedings. 
For that, we must turn to the work of scholars (cf. O’Barr 1982; Charrow 1982; 
Tiersma 1999; Dumas 2000a, b, and Harris 2001), who have studied in particular 
the use of the English language by legal professionals in oral court proceedings. 
Looking at the application of oral legal discourse in the multilingual court-
room, Stern (2004) studied the translation and interpretation services pro-
vided at the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), 
where the official languages are English and French and the working language 
Bosnian/Croatian/Serbian (BCS). Like the European Parliament interpreters 
quoted by Kent (2006), the respondents in Stern’s survey described the language 
that resulted from attempts to bridge the gaps between French and English le-
gal terms as a “langage-hybride, a jargon” that made the proceedings difficult to 
understand for witnesses (Stern 2004: 66). The translation staff, faced with the 
familiar problem of the lack of lexical equivalents for legal terms, relied on their 
own research and reference works such as dictionaries to arrive at suitable trans-
lations. These translations were often “verbose solutions” with explanations in 
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brackets or footnotes (ibid.: 65-66) that could not be used under the time con-
straints of simultaneous interpretation. Stern analyzed the strategies employed 
by interpreters, and found that they:
[…] use either a literal, semantic, speaker oriented, approach, or a pragmatic, com-
municative, recipient-oriented one, ensuring the comprehensibility of the message 
transferred to the listener. The latter consists of the interpreter’s resorting to what 
may appear to be a freer interpretation. It relies on lexico-grammatical changes, con-
veying the intention of the speaker in order to ensure comprehensibility to the recipi-
ent in the TL. (ibid.: 67)
Stern elaborates further on the recipient-oriented or listener-centred approach: 
“The listener-centred approach to the interpreting of legal language is a prag-
matic one. It relies on paraphrasing, or on a brief explanation of a phenomenon 
using existing signs”. To illustrate this strategy, she cites the interpretation of the 
English term “examination-in-chief” with a BCS phrase meaning “main exami-
nation by the prosecutor” and “you are going to be cross-examined” with a phrase 
back-translated into English as “you will be examined by the defence”. Although 
Stern cautions that this approach has its limits – and indeed, solutions such as 
these two run counter to standards such as the NAJIT Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility (NAJIT, n.d.) – she emphasizes that “the value of paraphrasing lies in 
placing the terms or expressions of the SL in a context. It is the added explicitness 
by reference to the context that makes the equivalent in the TL more compre-
hensible to the listener. That is the essence of the listener-oriented approach to 
interpreting” (Stern, 2004: 70).
Another scholar frames the judiciary interpreter’s dilemma as “the tension 
between adequacy and acceptability” (Ng, 2009). Ng’s research focuses on bilin-
gual court proceedings in Hong Kong, where both Chinese and English are of-
ficial languages. Interpreting predates the translation of statutes in Hong Kong, 
since it was not until 1974 that Chinese was added to English as an official lan-
guage, but witnesses had been giving testimony in Cantonese and other Chinese 
dialects for a long time before that (ibid.: 39). The first bilingual ordinance was en-
acted in 1989, and from that time onward all legislation was gradually translated 
into Chinese, resulting in a completely bilingual set of laws at present. Because 
court interpreters had already developed a repertoire of Chinese translations of 
legal terminology before translators began grappling with the difficult task of 
finding legal equivalents in two very different languages and two very different 
legal systems, they were using customary terms that did not match those eventu-
ally adopted by the translators. Ng sums up their dilemma in this way:
The customary translations, which have gained wide currency over the years, none-
theless continue to thrive in the courtroom. The official translations, however 
adequate[ly] the legal translator believes they represent the meanings of their English 
counterparts, sound alien, especially to laypeople. Thus, when putting a charge to a de-
fendant – one without legal representation in particular – the court interpreter often 
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has to resort to the customary translation, or to supplement the official translation 
with the customary one for fear that the defendant might think s/he is being charged 
with a different offence. (ibid.: 40-41)
To illustrate further, Ng cites a case in which a defendant’s conviction was over-
turned on appeal because she “could have been guilty under the law in English 
but innocent according to the Chinese translation” (ibid.: 45).
Whereas translators “prioritise accuracy over acceptability”, interpreters are 
“concerned not only about the accuracy or adequacy of the interpretation, but 
also the comprehensibility and acceptability of the interpretation”. She goes on to 
say that “in the process of interpreting, court interpreters benefit from a known 
or well-defined audience, which allows them to adopt a more flexible interpret-
ing approach depending on whom they are interpreting for” (ibid.: 41). Ng also 
makes the very pertinent observation that the meaning of legal terms changes 
over time, and common usage does not necessarily coincide with legal language. 
For example, the term “burglary”, which used to be translated and commonly ac-
cepted in Hong Kong as baoqie (meaning “breaking in to steal”), is now translated 
as ru wu fanfa (literally “entering a house to commit an offence therein”) in the 
Chinese version of the Theft Ordinance because the Chinese term baoqie corre-
sponds only partially to the common law concept of “burglary” (ibid.: 42). Further 
on, she points out:
However, the acceptability of ru wu fanfa remains low. As of today baoqie remains an 
oft-cited term both inside and outside the courtroom. In courts, it is not uncommon 
for court interpreters to supplement ru wu fanfa with the old customary term baoqie. 
Similarly, the news media use the term baoqie – instead of ru wu fanfa – most of the 
time in reporting burglary cases. (ibid.: 43)
A similar assertion could be made about the English term “court”, which is com-
monly translated into Spanish with the cognate “corte” by the news media and 
laypersons, even though lawyers would use the terms “juzgado” or “tribunal”. 
There are undoubtedly many instances of this phenomenon in languages that 
come into frequent contact with English. 
A related problem with legal terms is that a term may coincide with a per-
fectly ordinary word in the source language, and therefore, be readily accessible 
to laypersons, but the equivalent in the target language may be obscure and inac-
cessible to anyone without legal training. For example, “dismiss” in English is 
a high frequency word, whereas the Spanish equivalent, sobreseer, is a low-fre-
quency word that most laypersons would not understand. In cases such as this, 
an interpreter would be justified in selecting a commonly accepted term rather 
than the proper legal term.
In his analysis of legal translations, Loiacono (2010) refers to the “skopos” 
theory, “the notion that translation depends first and foremost on the intended 
function (skopos) of the target text as well as the nature of the source text: this 
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is the ‘functional approach’” (ibid.: 246). It is worth asking what the function of 
courtroom discourse is, i.e. who the intended audience is. In some cases, there 
may be multiple audiences: the monolingual or bilingual legal professionals pre-
sent in the courtroom, the monolingual laypersons participating in the proceed-
ings (most particularly, the accused), and the appellate courts, should the matter 
be appealed. This may explain why interpreters in Hong Kong provide two al-
ternative equivalents, the “official translation”, for consumption by legal profes-
sionals, and the “customary translation,” to be understood by the defendant (Ng, 
2009). In the context of the European Parliament, Kent (2006) also alludes to the 
purpose of the communication and the intended audience when she describes 
what has been called “documentary interpreting”:
‘Documentary interpreting’ refers to the realm of media not law: specifically, inter-
preters perform for the show. Documentary interpreting in this sense should not be 
confused with interpreting for the record. Although described as ‘debate,’ the speech-
es given by Members during plenaries are mainly directed to consumption by home 
country audiences via the internet, television, and radio rather than as engagement 
with colleagues who are in the same room. (ibid.: 57, emphasis in original)
Returning to the courtroom, it can also be said that much of what goes on in jury 
trials is “for the show”, either an attempt to sway the jury or to get something 
into the record for later appeals. Although the defendant has a right to be “pre-
sent” during all stages of the proceedings, that right does not make him an active 
consumer of the testimony. When an expert witness testifies, for example, the 
purpose is to convey to the jury (and to the appeals court, if necessary) the sci-
entific or technical basis for the evidence. The witness is addressing the jury, not 
the defendant (who is the user of the interpreting service, hence the interpreter’s 
audience). In contrast, when a judge directly addresses the defendant or an at-
torney questions a witness through an interpreter, the interpreter is more con-
strained by the “legal equivalence” principle and the concept of equality before 
the law (i.e. a defendant who does not speak the language of the court should not 
benefit from any clarification or explanation that a defendant who does speak the 
language would not receive). Lee concluded from her survey of judiciary inter-
preters and legal professionals that “[t]he different nature and purpose of com-
munication and the different levels of formality in court and tribunal settings 
may have implications” for the interpreter’s role (Lee, 2009: 50).
7. Interpreters’ solutions
The strategies adopted by interpreters when faced with source messages that are 
incomprehensible vary according to the situation in which they are working. In 
conference interpreting, there is somewhat more freedom to adjust the output 
to the audience and the type of conference (cf. Moser 1996; Kurz 1993/2002; Col-
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lados Aís 2002), whereas court interpreters are bound by the requirement to con-
serve “legal equivalence” (Gonzalez et al. 1991). 
There is some evidence that interpreters correct speaker errors, whether con-
sciously or not. The interpreters in the Miguelez study did not reproduce speak-
ers’ grammatical and syntactical errors in the source language (Miguelez 2001: 
11), a finding corroborated by Lee (2009). In addition, Miguelez discerned a ten-
dency to eliminate redundancies and repetitive language when interpreting pro-
ceedings simultaneously for the defendant (Miguelez 2001: 14). In Lee’s survey of 
court interpreters, some of the respondents “indicated that they sometimes sim-
plified questions, or explained legal terms rather than simply using the equiva-
lent terms in the target language, or that they conveyed only the main point of 
the question if they perceived that the witness was having difficulty understand-
ing” (Lee 2009: 47). An example of what some might consider an improper ad-
dition or clarification is experienced interpreters’ tendency to restate witnesses’ 
answers once they become clearer in context, which Miguelez attributes to the 
interpreters’ ability to “monitor and/or correct their renditions” (Miguelez 2001: 
13). Other strategies are employed by veteran interpreters when speakers make 
false starts:
In these cases, interpreters use many strategies including ignoring a clear and easy-
to-omit false start […], reproducing the phrase that comprises the false start using pro-
sodics to help convey meaning and ensure comprehension […], or waiting to grasp the 
meaning of the utterance and eliminate the false start […]. (ibid.: 16)
The study of juror comprehension by Napier et al. (2009) also suggests that in-
terpreters may improve the clarity of messages, because in some instances, the 
deaf participants in the mock jury trial (who used the services of interpreters) 
gave correct and more detailed answers to questions about the judge’s summa-
tion than hearing participants (ibid.: 110).
 In other cases, interpreters could not improve the clarity of the message even 
if they wanted to, and must opt for a more literal rendition. One of the examples 
of incoherent witness statements cited in Miguelez (2001: 18) is the following:
At this time I obtained test bullets using 38 S&W caliber ammunition of Winchester 
Western manufacture or loaded with bullets which were copper-coated lead and re-
covered test bullets from State’s Exhibit I.
Miguelez comments:
In these cases, the interpreter has no choice but to render an ongoing interpretation 
of what she/he hears as it is virtually impossible spontaneously to correct or improve 
the quality of spoken language when cohesion and coherence are so totally lacking. 
On some occasions, the context and previous testimony aid comprehension by both 
the interpreter and the target language receiver and, of course, their willingness and 
desire to achieve communication also plays a significant role. (ibid.: 18)
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Another solution is to develop and memorize a compendium of scripted formu-
las in a sort of “phrasebook”. In this case, a formula is “a group of words which 
is regularly employed to express a given typical and recurrent idea, regardless of 
the form that this idea takes in the source text” (Henriksen, 2007: 9). Thus, even 
though the idea is expressed repeatedly but in slightly different ways, the inter-
preter resorts to the same formula every time. In the courtroom, for example, 
one judge may use the term “right to counsel” while another uses “right to legal 
representation” or “right to an attorney”, and an interpreter might have a single 
pat phrase to render all three of these terms. It is important to point out that the 
interpreter must have extensive experience with the genre of speech in order to 
develop formulas that are truly equivalent in meaning (ibid.: 13). In other words, 
interpreters must be part of the “shared identity” emphasized by Kent (2009) in 
order to fully comprehend the source message and develop formulas that are 
truly equivalent in meaning.
A distinction should be made between the simplification or editing noted by 
Lee (2009) and providing “functional equivalents” (Miguelez, 2001; Loiacono, 
2010). Many interpreters resort to the latter expedient, particularly in the case 
of culturally bound references (Gonzalez et al., 1991: 488; Lee, 2009: 45). That is, 
they focus on speaker intent rather than rather than producing literal transla-
tions. As interpreters gain experience and familiarity with the genre of court-
room discourse, they become more adept at the conveying meaning of obscure 
terms such as “ran the plates” or “run density” instead of simply translating them 
literally, as interpreters-in-training do (Miguelez, 2001: 9). Miguelez makes an 
important point about the motives behind interpreters’ decisions when she indi-
cates that they have a desire to achieve communication (2001: 18). Moreover, the 
skopos of the message is an important factor:
As a simultaneous rendition of expert testimony provided to the defendant in order 
to protect his/her due process rights does not become part of the record or contribute 
to a judge’s or jury’s perception of credibility or trustworthiness, the primary goal be-
comes achieving communication. Hence, the high degree of equivalence required for 
interpreted testimony that does go on the record is not required in these instances. 
(ibid.: 16)
The strategies discussed above can be summed up as follows:
1. interpret literally, adhering to the form of the source language message, re-
gardless of whether the listener understands it;
2. correct errors in the source speech and improve on the style;
3. provide a functional equivalent that better reflects the meaning of the source 
message;
4.  use a memorized formula, developed with experience, that reflects the mean-
ing of the source message.
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The appropriate choice among these strategies depends on whether the source 
message is incomprehensible because the recipient of the interpreting is not 
the intended audience and, therefore, does not share the same contextual frame-
work, or because the message is so garbled that it is impossible for anyone to 
understand. The interpreter must also consider the skopos of the target message, 
the intended audience of the speaker, and the intended recipient of the interpre-
tation. In short, interpreters must exercise a great deal of judgment in choosing 
among these options, and the more experienced they are, the better their deci-
sions are likely to be.
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